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Experiences from the Djiboutian 
Humanitarian Demining Program 
This article examines the multiple partnerships that were formed during the 
planning and training deployment of a team comprised of a sailor, Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) soldiers, Marines, Department of State resourcers, 
a civilian demining organization, and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) 
planners. Several of the first-time partnerships discussed could be applicable 
to future Humanitarian Demining (HD) programs. A fundamental lesson is 
that the organizational parameters of selected U.S. government HD operations 
require flexibility, and may need to be dismembered and recombined to 
successfully accomplish a program's goals . Equally important, these 
cooperative efforts resulted in significant cost savings to U.S. taxpayers 
without degrading U.S. HD aid to Djibouti. 
by Dr. Alan Childress and 
Major Matt Zajac 
Introduction 
During january 200 I, U.S. Mari nes, 
Army SOF soldiers, and a Navy corps-
man joined American Embassy person-
nel and a U.S. Srate Departmenr HD 
contractOr (RONCO) to execute a U.S. 
government-sponsored H D Program in 
a Horn of Africa nation, D j ibouti. While 
the commencement of yet another U .S. 
demining program in itself is not neces-
sarily newsworthy, this particular opera-
tion enjoyed a few unique aspects that 
stemmed from experience and a spirit of 
cooperation that enabled the p layers to 
bring fresh ideas ro the planning table. 
From irs inception rhe program entailed 
the partnersh ip of the Department of 
State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
Humani tarian Demining Program office 
(PM/HO
P); 
Army SOF, Marine, and 
Navy HD-related trainers; the civilian 
demining community; the Dj iboutian 
government; the U.S. country ream in 
Djibouti; and U.S. Central Command 
planners. The success of the Dj i bouri H 0 
program is due in large part to selfless 
and accessible leadership and the conver-
gence of military, governmen t, and civil-
ian sector expertise. T he Djibouti HD 
p rogram results suggest that "out of the 
box" planning and execution cooperation 
can achieve significant cost, schedule, and 
quality-related consequences that open 
H 0 programs to unforeseen advantages 
(and pleasant surprises) . 
The Mine Problem 
Djibouti's mine problem is a result 
of ten years of civil war. Due to the nature 
of the warfare, the extent of the Djiboutian 
land mine problem is unknown. However, 
repeated mine incidents involving both 
military and civilian personnel, particularly 
in the fertile norrhern regions of the coun-
try, had brought economic activity, devel-
opment, and non-governmental relief op-
erations to a near standstill. Mines/UXO 
or the perception of the presence of mines/ 
UXO affects an estimated 45 percent of 
Dj ibouti. While French forces stationed 
within the country had provided some ru-
dimentary military breaching training to 
a small Djiboutian military contingent, 
Djibouti possessed neither the technical 
nor organizational capabili ty to address irs 
landmine problem. Consequently, in late 
1999 Djibouti requested U.S. government 
HD assistance. 
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The U.S.-Djibouti Plan 
Fol lowing U.S. government approval 
for HD assistance, the American Embassy 
in Djibouti, the D jiboutian government, 
and USCENTCOM developed a one-year 
HD coun try plan for Djibou ti. The 
Djibouti country plan outlined the U.S. 
train-the-trainer strategy to assist Djibouri 
in creating a self-sustain ing, civil ian-led 
demin ing organization capable of reducing 
the impact of the real or perceived landmine 
threat in the near term and making the 
nation mine-safe in the longer term. The 
plan focused on creating a Djiboutian ci-
vilian steering committee and mine action 
center organization, training and equipping 
a mi litary mine survey and clearance unit, 
developing a mine awareness and infor-
mation management capabi lity, and en-
ergizing the donor community within the 
country and mined regions to help sustain 
the program. Previous HD country plans 
were based on an 18-24 month planning 
and execution cycle. Clearly, compressing 
the length of rhe 18-24 month plan re-
quired the integration and cooperation of 
both the United States' and Djibouri's mili-
tary, government and civilian capabilities. 
T he program's planners could not visual-
ize just how far the integration of these H 0 
components would advance in rh e 
Djibouti program-and the development 
of new partnerships is truly the success story 
of this program. 
T he Department of Defense normally 
executes HD training programs with a stan-
dard package of Army SOF assets, which 
consists of Special Forces, C ivil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations teams, and gen-
erally aided by Army Explosive Ordinance 
Disposal (EOD) personnel plus a logistics 
cell. Due in part to a shortage of Special 
Forces asset s, DoD, through 
USCENTCOM, tasked the First Marine 
Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to lead the 
training ream, in parr because I MEF was 
familiar with Djibouti from conducting 
previous and on going humanitarian assis-
tance missions. Thus, in setting a DoD HD 
precedent, a team ro train and assist 
Djibouti establish a HD program was 
formed by USCENTCOM and led by l 
MEF. The team was comprised of Marine 
engineers and EOD experrs, Army Special 
Forces, C ivil Affairs, and Psychological 
Operation trainers, and a Navy corpsman. 
Each component brought unique skills ro 
the team and, while some technical capa-
bili ries overlapped, they provided a basis fo r 
interesting exchanges and professional de-
velopment opportunities for the Djiboutian 
trainees as well as the U.S. trainers. In ad-
dition, integrating the experience of the 
Special Forces team in training foreign sol-
diers ensured that cultural considerations 
were practiced and misperceptions quickly 
overcome. Not only did this unique con-
glomeration of fo rces succeed , it accom-
plished its cross-service planning and ex-
ecution cycle within 12 months. 
U.S. Be Djibouti Partnering 
Military and civil ian government co-
operation between the U.S. and Djibouti was 
already strong. Previous and on going U.S. 
humanitarian assistance programs, as well as 
outstanding personal relationships between 
the U.S. liaison officer and the Djiboutian 
senior military and civilian leadership, had 
developed an environment where frank as-
sessments and solid commitmenrs to the pro-
gram could be generated 
during a shortened plan-
ningstage. The Djibourian 
military agreed to provide a 
dedicated 35-man Ethiopia 
demining platoon led by a 
superb, multilingual, highly 
educated and selfless com-
mander, Captain Youssouf, 
an ex-French militaqcamp 
to house a permanent mine 
action center wirh bi lleting 
and training faci lities, and 
various logistical support. 
The Djiboutian military 
obtained government ap-
proval to waive cusroms fees 
and taxes on HD-related equipment and to 
support import clearance of mine/UXO de-
struction training devices. T he stage was set 
for USCENTCOM components to con-
duct humanitarian demining training. 
Preparing for Training 
The Djiboutianmilitary provided train-
general, DOS PM/HOP contracts mine 
clearance to industry, while DoD trains and 
equips nations to demine d1emselves d1rough 
train-the-trainer programs. Seldom have the 
two approaches combined ro achieve rime 
and cost savings. 
Training the Training Team 
Prior to deployment, all U.S. trainers 
attended the Humanitarian Demining Train-
ing Center (HDTC) at Fort Leonard Wood, 
MO, where they received important lessons 
on not only the technical aspects of mine 
action bur critical, experience-based guidance 
on the development of lesson plans, host-
nation civil organization development and 
overcoming common training challenges. It 
was at HDTC that the face-to-face integra-
tion of this diverse, three-service military 
training ream really began. As an example of 
the cooperation and integration between the 
two groups, the HDTC D irector led a party 
to Djibouti to collect lessons learned while 
also contributing their expertise to the train-
ers at work. 
Djibouti Be U.S. 
Relationships 
T h e ac tu al tra in ing of th e 
Djiboutian demining ream began in Feb-
ruary and was completed in May 2001. 
During this period, two significant. part- · 
nerships developed that contributed to 
the program's success. One of these was 
p redictable wh ile the other evolved as 
another "first" for USCENTCOM HD 
ing and billeting facilities located at Camp 
LeMonier. However, since these premises had 
nor been occupied for so me years, 
USCENTCOM's requirements analysis sur-
vey team determined that renovation of these 
facilities was necessary prior to inhabiting 
them. The spirit of cooperation of Depart-
ment of State PM/HD P to provide up front 
funds and support to refurbish these facili-
ties- before military training began- sig-
nificantly reduced start-up time. This inrer-
agency (DOS and DoD) cooperation en-
abled facility renovation and training plan-
ning to occur simultaneously. M ilitary forces 
were not available to perform the renova-
tions nor were they readily available to con-
tract and oversee the renovation project at 
Camp LeMonier. PM/HDP's initial involve-
ment was crucial to the timely start of the 
USCENTCOM HD program in Djibouti 
and soon expanded from infrastrucrure and 
logistical support for trainer success, to sus-
tainment support of the program as a whole. 
In previous and current programs, DOS 
PM/HOP executes (outsources) thei r HD 
programs through a civilian contractor, 
RONCO, while DoD's regional command, 
USCENTCOM, execures irs HD programs 
through military train-the-trainer programs, 
independent of civilian trainer support. In 
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• Map reading training. 
was the development of mutual respect 
and friendship between the U.S. trainers 
and the members of the Djiboutian HD 
ream. Although separated by an enor-
mous cultural gap that span ned both per-
sonal and professional experiences, mu-
rual respen between individuals and 
reams quickly developed. Many close 
friendships and professional exchanges 
conrinue today. While secondary to the 
value we may place on people's safecy and 
freedom, the role of humanitarian 
demining as an engagement opportunicy 
was underscored in Djibouti. 
Department of State 
Logistics Support 
The second unpredicred new partner-
ship that evolved revolves around the suc-
cess of PM/HDP's contractor, RONCO, 
with renovating the facilities. Immediate re-
sults were gained from the RONCO 
supervisor's knowledge of the local economy, 
his language skills and his experience with 
the business culture. Historically, local logis-
tical support has generally been the respon-
sibilicyof the Civil Affairs liaison officer. His 
training in civil-military cooperation and lan-
guage skills made him rhe def.1ult choice. 
However, with the Civil Affairs liaison of-
ficer continuously tied up with daily logisti-
cal requirements, the U.S. team would lose 
his skills in advising and coordinating the 
integration of host nation civil authorities 
and the non-governmemal support essential 
to program sustainment. Recognizing this 
misapplication of a scarce resource, the H D 
Training Team commander requested that 
PM/HOP continue supporting RONCO's 
involvement as the HD Training Team's lo-
gistical contracting and disbursing officer. His 
management of the day-ro-day logistical 
needs, financial accounting, and his abilicy 
to quickly effect facilicy repairs allowed the 
HDTraining Team to focus on continuously 
evaluating and improving training. Yer this 
evolution of rhe USCENTCOM-DOS-
RONCO partnership still had one unfore-
seen, bur highly successfUl, permutation to 
realize. 
Sustainment Innovations 
The final partnership developments, 
and those most important to rhe HD 
program's sustainment, were recognized 
during rhe HD training and given urgency 
as the USCENTCOM team prepared to 
depart. The HDTraining leam had accom-
plished irs mission and the Djibourian mili-
tary demining team proved their capabili-
ties in a final, our-of-camp, week long train-
ing scenario designed to exercise indepen-
dent planning, mine survey and clearance, 
information management, local mine aware-
ness and leadership skills. At the national 
level, the Civil Affairs liaison officer had suc-
cessfully integrated a national mine action 
center into an exisringDjibourian cross-min-
isterial steering committee and obtained sup-
port from the U.S. Ambassador, the United 
Nations Acting Resident Representative, and 
other promi nenr non-governmental organi-
zations acrive within the country. Yet the new 
Djibomian HD organization (now formed 
as the Djiboutian Mine Action Center or 
DMAC) lacked planning and managerial 
skills and critical mine action experience--
both at the national and execution levels 
where the military had been trained. The HD 
Training Team's research into overcoming 
these potentially debilitating wealmesses re-
sulted in the reconfigurarion of and imple-
mentation of a new USCENTCOM-DOS 
HD partnership. 
Since one of the Country Plan's fUn-
damental goals was the establishment of a 
self-sustaining, national mine action organi-
zation under a civilian-led steering commit-
tee, ir seemed logical that the American 
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Embassy in Djibouti, as the DOS represen-
tative within the country, should assume 
oversight of the HD program and its con-
tinued implemenration. However, prior to 
the Djiboutian HD program, 
USCENTCOM had performed this fi.mc-
rion, usually through the U.S. Liaison Of-
ficer of the Defense Attache. The HD 
Training Team recommended to rhe U.S. 
Ambassador, whose experience with HD 
progran1s in the region encompassed almost 
a decade, ro assign responsibilicy for the con-
tinued oversight of the H D program to one 
of his Country Team personnel-perhaps 
the Political-Military Advisor. Obviously, 
close cooperation berween the Embassy Po-
litical-Military Advisor and the DoD-
USCENTCOM Liaison Officer would be 
necessary. Thus, while USCENTCOM 
would conduct periodic assessment visits to 
evaluate the Djiboutian military's evolving 
capabilities and re-train if required, respon-
sibilicy to assist rhe Djiboutian Government 
in strengthening its civilian-led mine action 
organization and to generate non-govern-
menral, long-term progran1 sustainment sup-
port rested with a Country Team civilian ad-
visor. This arrangement recogn izes rhat 
longer-term U.S. sustainment is a fUnction 
of DOS funding, nor DoD, and in May 
2001, the first DOS Embassy-based HD 
program manager attended 
USCENTCOM's annual HD planning 
conference in Tampa, FL. 
Another outcome of rhe 
USCENTCOM and DOS-RONCO parr-
nership was the solution to providing on-
the-ground experience and oversight ro the 
newly trained Djiboutian military. Given 
that RONCO's representative now had first-
hand knowledge of rhe training provided to 
rhe Djiboutian military and their land mine 
problem, the HD Training Team recom-
mended ro the Ambassador that parr of the 
DOS sustainment money for 2001 be used 
ro retain RONCO's services. RONCO's role 
would then change from that of logistical 
facilitator to an advisor to the Djibourian 
Mine Action Center (DMAC). This would 
provide several immediate benefits. First, a 
civilian demining firm's employees would 
nor be under the legal restrictions that pre-
vent DoD personnel from entering known 
mine-threatened areas. This would allow the 
Djiboutian HD program to benefit from 
current mine action experience at the loca-
tion where demining is occurring. Second, 
ir provides a direct link between the 
Djiboutian military and the DOS represen-
tative in the American Embassy, strengthen-
ing the abilicy of DOS to influence the use 
of USG provided resources. Finally, the 
RONCO representative can provide ac-
curate information regarding rhe 
Dj ibourian programs development, en-
hancing USCENTCOM 's periodic train-
ing assessments. 
Cost Reductions and 
Increased Training and 
Security Benefits 
The results of completing infrastruc-
ture renovations at Camp LeMonier prior 
to the arrival of U.S. trainers, and remov-
ing major burdens of logistical support 
from the Country Team and the Civil Af-
fairs officer can hardly be exaggerated. 
When rhe trainers arrived in Djibouti their 
billers were secure and ready for occupancy, 
transportation vehicles were in place, of-
fices and training facilities outfitted, and 
messing areas complete. The savings in 
hotel/villa billeting and transportation 
costs were considerable and the en tire ream 
was able to work and live in a secure envi-
ronment. The Djibourian cadre were also 
housed ar Camp LeMonier, which resulted 
in training economies and relationship 
building not achieved in previous 
USCENTCOM HD operations. In ad-
dition, freeing rhe Civil Affairs officer from 
logistical support details allowed him to 
seek support from other agencies in teres ted 
in helping the Djibourians and ro help rhe 
government form a civilian-led HD orga-
nization. Finally, the costs associated with 
four 7- 10 day visits to Djibouti by a war-
ranted military contracting officer were 
saved through PM/HDP'sconrractedsup-
porr. Again, this was a result of 
USCENTCOM-PM/HDP parrnering in 
rhe planning stages and a PM/HOP desk 
officer volunteering to provide support, 
through RONCO, in advance of training 
start-up. Although breaking new ground 
during this cooperative endeavor generated 
several lessons learned, the experience and 
results might serve as a model for future 
HD engagemems in orher mine-inflicted 
nations seeking U.S. assistance. 
Shifting the Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOE) 
Paradigm 
While nor directly related to rhe U.S.-
supporred Djibouti HD program, an ad-
ditional lesson is raking shape from the 
Djibouti experience. The authors note that 
HD success has traditionally been measured 
in quamiries such as numbers of mines and 
UXO neutralized, minefields or area 
cleared, and reduction in casualties. Donors 
in particular often seek such numbers as 
incentives to cominue support. A notion 
being advanced today, in particular by the 
UN, is that success may also be a fUnction 
of socio-economic impact considerations 
and people's perception of a mine threat. 
Although Djibouti was nor recognized as a 
high or even medium-threat mined nation, 
roughly one-third of the northern region 
was immobilized due to a perception of 
mines and UXO. Exactly how much of that 
perception is real icy may be determined by 
the Djiboutian Mine Action Center as ir 
broadens its operations; however, we pre-
dict that rhe presence of mine/UXO aware-
ness and clearance teams will open the re-
gions faster than exhibiting a number of 
mines/UXO cleared. In fact, relatively few 
mines may be found and still the areas will 
have been opened to farming and com-
merce. Reduction in casualties remains the 
most important consideration. Still, MOE 
calculated from periodic reports of num-
bers of mines/UXO or minefields cleared 
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will nor describe success in socioeconomic 
factors such as people returned to their 
homelands, increased productivity, and 
opened agricultural areas. We would chal-
lenge Djibouti and other mine-affected 
nations to gauge their mine threat successes 
from a combined socioeconomic and ca-
sualcy reduction base. 
Conclusion 
The article examined rhe multiple parr-
nerships that were formed during the plan-
ning and execution of a demining program 
by a relatively small ream of dedicated SOF 
soldiers, marines, a sailor, and the benefits 
achieved from USCENTCOM and DOS 
cooperating and coordinating throughout 
the program. Several of the partnerships dis-
cussed may be applied to orher HD pro-
grams. A fUndamental lesson is that the or-
ganizational parameters ofUSG HD opera-
tions must remain flexible, and indeed may 
need ro be dismembered and recombined, 
ro successfully meet a program's goals. Self-
less and accessible leadership is a vital ele-
ment in developing the inter-service relation-
ships necessary to achieve these goals in a 
compressed time span. The Djibourian Hu-
manitarian Demining Training Team's flex-
ible approach, and the unique partnerships 
generated, resulted in categorical success and 
provided unforeseen advantages to the U.S. 
demining program in Djibouti. • 
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